

## Problem Set 8

Due: April 10

**Reading:** Sections 11.7– 11.10, 11.6

### Problem 1.


Prove Corollary 11.10.12: If all edges in a finite weighted graph have distinct weights, then the graph has a *unique* MST in the course textbook.

*Hint:* Suppose  $M$  and  $N$  were different MST's of the same graph. Let  $e$  be the smallest edge in one and not the other, say  $e \in M - N$ , and observe that  $N + e$  must have a cycle.

### Problem 2.

A basic example of a simple graph with chromatic number  $n$  is the complete graph on  $n$  vertices, that is  $\chi(K_n) = n$ . This implies that any graph with  $K_n$  as a subgraph must have chromatic number at least  $n$ . It's a common misconception to think that, conversely, graphs with high chromatic number must contain a large complete subgraph. In this problem we exhibit a simple example countering this misconception, namely a graph with chromatic number four that contains no *triangle*—length three cycle—and hence no subgraph isomorphic to  $K_n$  for  $n \geq 3$ . Namely, let  $G$  be the 11-vertex graph of Figure 1. The reader can verify that  $G$  is triangle-free.

- (a) Show that  $G$  is 4-colorable.
- (b) Prove that  $G$  can't be colored with 3 colors.



**Figure 1** Graph  $G$  with no triangles and  $\chi(G) = 4$ .

### Problem 3.

The preferences among 4 boys and 4 girls are partially specified in the following table:

B1:	G1	G2	-	-
B2:	G2	G1	-	-
B3:	-	-	G4	G3
B4:	-	-	G3	G4
G1:	B2	B1	-	-
G2:	B1	B2	-	-
G3:	-	-	B3	B4
G4:	-	-	B4	B3

(a) Verify that

$$(B1, G1), (B2, G2), (B3, G3), (B4, G4)$$

will be a stable matching whatever the unspecified preferences may be.

(b) Explain why the stable matching above is neither boy-optimal nor boy-pessimal and so will not be an outcome of the Mating Ritual.

(c) Describe how to define a set of marriage preferences among  $n$  boys and  $n$  girls which have at least  $2^{n/2}$  stable assignments.

*Hint:* Arrange the boys into a list of  $n/2$  pairs, and likewise arrange the girls into a list of  $n/2$  pairs of girls. Choose preferences so that the  $k$ th pair of boys ranks the  $k$ th pair of girls just below the previous pairs of girls, and likewise for the  $k$ th pair of girls. Within the  $k$ th pairs, make sure each boy's first choice girl in the pair prefers the other boy in the pair.

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